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Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2001 · Civil Procedure

Civil ProcedureRelation BackAmended PleadingsRule 15(c)(3)Rule 15(c)(3)Rule 4(m)relation backJohn Doe defendants

Facts

Dorothy Singletary sued PADOC, SCI-Rockview, Superintendent Mazurkiewicz, and "Unknown Corrections Officers" after her son Edward committed suicide while incarcerated at SCI-Rockview. After the statute of limitations had expired, she sought to amend the complaint to add Robert Regan, a staff psychologist who had evaluated Edward shortly before the suicide. Regan had no administrative or supervisory duties, and there was no evidence that he received actual notice of the lawsuit within Rule 4(m)'s 120-day period. The attorney who later represented the defendants did not enter the case until after that 120-day period had run.

Issue

Whether plaintiff's post-limitations amendment substituting Robert Regan for previously unnamed defendants could relate back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3). More specifically, did Regan receive timely notice of the institution of the action, either through a shared attorney or an identity of interest with originally named defendants, and therefore satisfy Rule 15(c)(3)(A)?

Rule

An amendment changing or adding a party relates back under Rule 15(c)(3) only if: (1) the claim arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading; (2) within the Rule 4(m) service period, the party to be added received notice of the institution of the action sufficient to avoid prejudice; and (3) within that same period, the party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against that party. Notice under Rule 15(c)(3) may be imputed through either a shared attorney or an identity of interest, but a shared-attorney theory requires a basis to infer communication with the proposed defendant within the Rule 4(m) period, and a non-management employee ordinarily lacks sufficient identity of interest with the employer absent additional circumstances showing likely notice.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Portland, Maine, Lena Ortiz timely filed a federal civil-rights complaint against North Harbor Detention Center, its warden, and several unnamed officers after an incident in the jail infirmary. Forty days later, attorney Mara Vance entered an appearance for the named defendants and, within the Rule 4(m) period, interviewed staff nurse Colin Reese about the allegations and told him he might later be added to the suit. After the limitations period expired, Lena moved to amend to name Reese personally.

Under the majority's approach, what is the strongest argument that the amendment relates back?

Explanation. Rule 15(c)(3) requires timely notice of the institution of the action within the Rule 4(m) period. The majority endorsed imputing notice through a shared attorney when the attorney's relationship with both the original defendants and the proposed defendant supports an inference that the attorney communicated the existence of the lawsuit to the proposed defendant within that period. Here, counsel entered early and actually interviewed Reese about the suit within the service period, making shared-attorney notice the strongest basis for relation back. Employment alone is not enough, and formal service is not required. (Derived from Singletary v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (n.d.).)