State v. Christensen

Iowa Court of Appeals · 1987 · Evidence

414 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceRule 404(b)other bad actspropensityabsence of mistakeintentsexual abusematerial issue

Facts

The State charged Christensen with third-degree sexual abuse, false imprisonment, and assault based on allegations by Debora Delp, with whom he had lived for a short period in 1986. At trial, the State presented testimony from Carol Cohn, who had lived with Christensen in 1983-84, that he had physically and sexually abused her in ways similar in some respects to Delp's allegations. No criminal charges had resulted from Cohn's allegations, and she had not reported them to authorities. The district court admitted Cohn's testimony as relevant to absence of mistake or accident concerning Delp's consent to sexual intercourse.

Issue

Did the district court err under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) by admitting testimony from another woman about Christensen's prior alleged sexual and physical abuse to show absence of mistake or accident, or intent, regarding Delp's consent in a prosecution for third-degree sexual abuse?

Rule

Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove character in order to show conduct in conformity therewith. Such evidence is admissible only if, first, it is relevant to a legitimate and material issue other than propensity, and second, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. In a prosecution under Iowa Code section 709.4(1), a defendant's awareness of the victim's lack of consent is not an element of third-degree sexual abuse, so mistake of fact as to consent is not an available defense and other-acts evidence cannot be admitted to rebut that nonmaterial issue.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Des Moines, prosecutors charge Tyler Boone with third-degree sexual abuse under a statute requiring proof that the sex act was done by force or against the will of the other participant. At trial, the State offers testimony from Mira Patel, who says Tyler forced her into sex three years earlier, to prove Tyler could not have mistakenly believed the complainant in the charged incident consented.

Should the trial court admit Mira's testimony for that stated purpose?

Explanation. Under the majority rule, other-acts evidence is admissible only if it is relevant to a legitimate, material issue other than propensity and survives prejudice balancing. In a third-degree sexual abuse prosecution requiring proof that the act was done by force or against the victim's will, the defendant's awareness of nonconsent is not an element. Therefore, a mistake-of-fact theory about consent is not a material issue, so prior-act evidence offered to rebut that theory is inadmissible.