Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. McCleery

Supreme Court of Texas · Torts

TortsNegligenceProximate CauseCause in Factproximate causecause in factbut forsubstantial factor

Facts

McCleery was a passenger in a truck driven by Hardgrave when the truck struck the side of a Texas & Pacific freight train already crossing South Lamar Street in Dallas at about 11:15 p.m. A city ordinance limited train speed to 12 miles per hour, but the engineer knew of the ordinance and was operating the train at about 25 miles per hour. Visibility was limited by obstructions until the truck was about 90 feet from the crossing and the train was about 234 feet away, and Hardgrave testified he did not see the train until it was almost on the road. The only evidence of first impact placed it at the fifth car behind the engine units, and no train crew member saw the truck before the collision.

Issue

Was there evidence of probative force to support the jury's finding that the train's speed in excess of 12 miles per hour was a proximate cause of the collision and McCleery's injuries? Also, could the remand be upheld on the alternative ground that lookout issues should have been submitted?

Rule

Proximate cause has two elements: foreseeability and cause in fact. Cause in fact exists only when the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and, except in situations involving contributing conduct by more than one person, the harm must be one that would not have occurred but for the negligence; a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that without the alleged negligent act the result would not have occurred.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Fort Worth, a city ordinance limits freight trains to 15 miles per hour at downtown crossings. A Lonetree Rail freight train entered a crossing at 28 miles per hour, and Maya Soto drove her van into the side of the train after the engine and several cars had already occupied the intersection. Maya testifies that she never looked at the flashing warning mast and did not notice the train until it was "right there."

If Maya sues the railroad based only on the train's excessive speed, which is the strongest argument for the railroad on proximate cause?

Explanation. The majority opinion treats foreseeability and cause in fact as separate elements of proximate cause. Even assuming excessive speed is negligent and creates foreseeable risk, the plaintiff must still show the speed was a substantial factor and that the harm would not have occurred but for that speed. Where the driver did not look at the warning device and did not see the train until it was immediately upon the crossing, a conclusion that lawful speed would have prevented the collision is speculative.