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Texas v. Cobb

Supreme Court of the United States · 2001 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureSixth AmendmentRight to CounselSixth Amendmentright to counseloffense specificBlockburgercharged offenses

Facts

Respondent was indicted for burglary of the Owings residence, and counsel was appointed to represent him on that charge. While free on bond, he was arrested after his father reported that respondent had confessed to killing Margaret Owings during the burglary; after receiving Miranda warnings and waiving those rights, respondent confessed to murdering Margaret and her child Kori Rae and led police to their bodies. At the time of that confession, respondent had not been charged with the murders, only with burglary. He was later convicted of capital murder for murdering more than one person in the course of a single criminal transaction.

Issue

Does a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, once attached to a charged offense, also extend to other offenses that are factually related to the charged offense? If not, was respondent's confession to the uncharged murders admissible even though counsel had already been appointed on the burglary charge?

Rule

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific and does not extend to uncharged offenses merely because they are factually related to a charged offense. When the right attaches, it encompasses only the charged offense and any other offense that would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test, meaning each offense must not require proof of a fact which the other does not.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, Marcus Doyle was formally charged with felony vandalism for spray-painting a courthouse wall, and counsel was appointed at his initial appearance. Two weeks later, while in custody on an unrelated traffic warrant, detectives gave Marcus Miranda warnings and questioned him about an uncharged arson at the same courthouse that occurred during the same night. Marcus waived and confessed to the arson.

Is Marcus's confession to arson barred by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

Explanation. The majority held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It attaches only to charged offenses and to any uncharged offense that would count as the same offense under Blockburger. Factual overlap alone is insufficient. Thus, questioning about the uncharged arson is not barred unless its statutory elements make it the same offense as the charged vandalism.