Home › Case briefs › Constitutional Law

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States · 2001 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawClean Air ActEPANAAQSnondelegationintelligible principlecost considerationChevron

Facts

Section 109 of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to promulgate and periodically revise national ambient air quality standards for pollutants covered by § 108 criteria documents. In 1997, EPA revised the NAAQS for particulate matter and ozone, prompting challenges by industry and state respondents. Respondents argued that § 109(b)(1) unconstitutionally delegated legislative power and that EPA should consider implementation costs when setting the standards. A further dispute arose over whether EPA's announced policy for implementing the revised ozone standard under Part D was reviewable and lawful.

Issue

Whether § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act permits EPA to consider implementation costs in setting NAAQS and whether that provision unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to EPA. Also, whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review EPA's interpretation of Part D governing implementation of the revised ozone NAAQS, and if so whether that interpretation was permissible.

Rule

Section 109(b)(1) requires EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards at a level requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety, and that standard-setting process does not permit consideration of implementation costs. A delegation is constitutional if Congress supplies an intelligible principle to guide agency action; § 109(b)(1)'s requirement that standards be requisite, meaning sufficient but not more than necessary, to protect public health satisfies that test. Agency action is reviewable under the Clean Air Act when it marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process and is fit and ripe for review, but Chevron deference does not permit an agency to adopt an interpretation that nullifies textually applicable statutory limits on its discretion.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress creates the National Water Safety Board and directs it to set maximum contaminant levels in drinking water at concentrations "necessary to protect public health" with an "adequate margin of safety." In a final rule issued from Washington, D.C., the Board selects a less stringent limit after expressly balancing projected health benefits against compliance costs for treatment plants in Ohio and Indiana.

If a regulated utility challenges the rule, how should a court rule on the Board's reliance on compliance costs in setting the standard?

Explanation. Where Congress directs an agency to set a standard at a level requisite or necessary to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, the instruction is health-based and unambiguously excludes implementation costs from the initial standard-setting determination. The majority reasoned that cost consideration must be textually committed in a clear way, especially where the standard drives a major regulatory scheme. Terms like "requisite" and "adequate margin of safety" do not smuggle cost balancing into the statute. (Derived from Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. (2001).)